- The government moved the National Investigation Department to the Prime Minister’s Office to improve national security coordination and speed up critical decision-making processes.
- Critics argue that administrative relocation cannot fix intelligence failures, citing the 2025 Gen Z uprising as a major lapse in analytical effectiveness.
- Modernizing the agency requires better analytical tools, increased resources, and a balance between direct prime ministerial access and independent parliamentary oversight.
- Relocating the NID creates potential coordination challenges, necessitating robust mechanisms for sharing integrated intelligence across various security agencies and ministries.
Kathmandu — The National Investigation Department (NID) has once again been brought under the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, reviving a long-running debate over the structure, effectiveness and accountability of Nepal’s intelligence system.
The decision to place the country’s principal civilian intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister’s Office has been justified on the grounds that information related to national security should reach the highest level of government quickly and efficiently.
The government argues that direct oversight by the Prime Minister will facilitate faster decision-making and improve coordination on matters concerning national security. However, Nepal’s experience with the NID suggests that the issue is more complicated than simply determining where the department should be located administratively.
The more important questions are what kind of intelligence the department produces, how quickly it provides that intelligence, how accurately it assesses potential risks, and how effectively the government uses the information it receives.
The NID had traditionally operated under the Ministry of Home Affairs. During the government led by then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, the department was brought under the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. The arrangement was subsequently changed by the government led by interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki following the Gen Z uprising of September 2025, when the department was returned to the Home Ministry.
The current government led by Prime Minister Balendra Shah again brought the NID under the Prime Minister’s Office in May 2026 through an amendment to the Government of Nepal (Allocation of Business) Regulations.
The government has since moved to establish the arrangement on a firmer legal basis through legislation related to the Nepal Special Service Act. The bill has generated debate in Parliament over whether the NID should remain under the Prime Minister or be returned to the Home Ministry.
This repeated movement of the intelligence agency between the Home Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office has raised a fundamental question: Does changing the department’s administrative location actually improve its performance?
The Gen Z Movement Raised Serious Questions
The real test of an intelligence agency comes during a crisis.
Collecting information under normal circumstances is one thing. Identifying warning signs before a major political or social crisis develops, assessing the potential consequences and alerting the government in sufficient time is the more important responsibility of an intelligence agency.
The Gen Z movement of September 2025 brought this issue sharply into focus.
The protests began as a youth-led movement demanding greater political accountability and an end to corruption and eventually escalated into widespread violence, arson and destruction of government and public property. The events of September 8 and 9 resulted in a major political crisis and ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli.
The National Human Rights Commission subsequently investigated the events, including allegations of excessive use of force and other human rights violations.
The episode inevitably raised questions about the effectiveness of Nepal’s intelligence system.
At the time of the Gen Z uprising, the NID was already under the Prime Minister’s Office. Therefore, the experience cannot simply be explained by saying that the intelligence agency was under the wrong ministry.
The more fundamental questions are different.
Was sufficient information available before the crisis? If so, how was it analyzed? Were warnings communicated to the political leadership in time? How were NID assessments coordinated with information collected by the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and other security agencies? And, most importantly, were the available intelligence assessments properly considered in government decision-making?
These questions deserve serious institutional examination.
Intelligence Is More Than Information Collection
The common perception of an intelligence agency is that its primary responsibility is to collect information secretly.
Modern intelligence work, however, goes far beyond information gathering.
An effective intelligence organization must determine which information is reliable, which is rumor, which developments could become significant threats, and which issues require immediate attention from the political leadership.
The distinction between information and intelligence is therefore crucial.
Information may indicate that a demonstration is being organized. Intelligence analysis should determine the likely scale of the demonstration, the possibility of violence, potential flashpoints, the groups or factors that could influence the situation, and the measures that could prevent escalation.
This analytical capacity is what transforms raw information into actionable intelligence.
Nepal’s security environment has also become increasingly complex.
In addition to conventional security threats and political unrest, intelligence agencies must now monitor cyber threats, misinformation and disinformation, organized crime, financial crime, cross-border criminal activities, trafficking, foreign influence and other developments that could affect national security and social stability.
These challenges require modern technology, specialized expertise and professional analytical capabilities.
Traditional intelligence-gathering methods alone are no longer sufficient.
What Other Democracies Can Teach Nepal
In many democratic countries, national intelligence agencies maintain close links with the highest level of government.
However, there is an important distinction: intelligence agencies may receive significant authority and direct access to political leaders, but their activities are also subject to legal, parliamentary or independent oversight.
The United Kingdom, for example, has several intelligence organizations operating within a system that includes parliamentary oversight.
The United States has developed mechanisms to coordinate intelligence collected by different agencies and provide national leaders with integrated strategic assessments.
Canada and Australia have similarly established parliamentary and independent oversight mechanisms for intelligence activities.
The lesson from these systems is not that intelligence agencies should be kept away from the Prime Minister.
Rather, the lesson is that an intelligence agency should have sufficient access and authority to protect national security while remaining professionally independent and institutionally accountable.
That balance is particularly important in Nepal.
The Coordination Challenge
The return of the NID to the Prime Minister’s Office also creates a potential coordination challenge.
The Nepal Police and Armed Police Force remain under the Ministry of Home Affairs, while the Nepal Army operates under its own command structure. The NID, meanwhile, reports through the Prime Minister’s Office.
National security incidents often require information from all of these institutions.
For example, a local dispute may initially appear to be a routine law-and-order matter. Intelligence officials may identify warning signs, the Nepal Police may be responsible for maintaining public order, and the Armed Police Force may be deployed if the situation escalates. Depending on the circumstances and applicable law, other security institutions may also become involved.
For that reason, information cannot remain isolated within individual agencies.
At the district level, representatives of the NID participate in security coordination mechanisms, where information collected by different security agencies should be shared and assessed collectively.
The same principle needs to apply at the national level.
If the NID operates under the Prime Minister’s Office while the police and armed police remain under the Home Ministry, there must be a clear mechanism for sharing intelligence and producing coordinated assessments.
Otherwise, different agencies may possess pieces of the same security picture without any institution having a complete understanding of the emerging threat.
Resources Matter as Much as Structure
Another major issue facing the NID is the availability of adequate resources.
Intelligence work requires sustained investment in human resources, technology, secure communications, information systems and analytical capabilities.
Information cannot be collected effectively without trained personnel. It cannot be securely managed without appropriate technology. And it cannot be transformed into useful intelligence without professional analysts.
Recent reporting has also raised concerns about financial and operational constraints affecting the department. Such concerns deserve careful examination by the government and Parliament because intelligence capability ultimately depends on both institutional design and adequate resources.
Simply transferring an agency from one ministry to another cannot resolve these problems.
If the government expects the NID to provide sophisticated assessments of political, economic, technological and security threats, it must also provide the resources required to develop those capabilities.
The Risk of Political Influence
Placing an intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister has an obvious advantage.
Sensitive information can reach the highest level of political leadership without passing through unnecessary administrative layers.
But the same arrangement also creates a potential risk.
The central question is whether intelligence institutions serve the long-term interests of the state or become instruments of the political interests of the government in power.
This is why democratic countries have developed systems of parliamentary and independent oversight for intelligence agencies.
Nepal faces the same institutional challenge.
If the NID is given greater authority and closer access to the Prime Minister, there should also be clear legal safeguards against political misuse.
Parliament should have an appropriate mechanism to review intelligence institutions without compromising legitimate operational secrecy. The legal framework should clearly define the agency’s mandate, powers, responsibilities and accountability.
Reform Must Go Beyond Changing the Reporting Line
The government’s decision to return the NID to the Prime Minister’s Office should therefore be viewed as only one component of broader intelligence-sector reform.
The department needs professional and technically skilled personnel, modern information systems, improved analytical capabilities and adequate resources.
Recruitment and promotion should be based on professionalism and competence. Intelligence officers should receive specialized training in areas such as cyber security, financial crime, organized crime, international security, data analysis and emerging technologies.
The government must also strengthen cooperation between the NID, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and Nepal Army.
A situation in which every agency collects information but keeps it within its own institutional boundaries could seriously weaken national security.
The objective should be to ensure that relevant information reaches the appropriate decision-makers in a timely and usable form.
Nepal Needs a Strong Early-Warning System
The success of the NID should not be measured simply by the number of intelligence reports produced or the number of sources it maintains.
The real measure of success should be its ability to provide early warnings.
A strong intelligence agency should be able to answer four basic questions:
What could happen?
How likely is it to happen?
Where is the greatest risk?
What should the government do now to prevent or reduce the risk?
This is the essence of an effective early-warning system.
The Gen Z movement demonstrated why this capability is important.
Identifying a protest after it has already begun is not the same as recognizing the social, political and organizational conditions that could turn a protest into a nationwide crisis.
The intelligence system must therefore be capable of identifying patterns before they become emergencies.
Leadership Will Also Face Greater Scrutiny
Tekendra Karki currently heads the National Investigation Department.
With the department now under the Prime Minister’s Office, its leadership has greater responsibility to ensure that intelligence reaches the Prime Minister in a timely and professionally assessed form.
However, institutional responsibility should not be placed entirely on the department chief.
The effectiveness of intelligence depends on the entire system—including field officers, analysts, senior leadership, technology, resources, inter-agency coordination and, ultimately, political decision-makers.
Even the most accurate intelligence is of limited value if political leaders fail to consider or act upon credible warnings.
The relationship between intelligence producers and political decision-makers must therefore be based on professionalism, trust and institutional responsibility.
Parliament’s Role Is Increasingly Important
The ongoing parliamentary debate over the legal status of the NID provides an opportunity to address these broader issues.
The debate should not be limited to whether the department should remain under the Prime Minister’s Office or return to the Home Ministry.
Parliament should also examine the agency’s mandate, budget, recruitment system, operational resources, analytical capacity, information-sharing mechanisms and oversight arrangements.
A modern intelligence system requires both effectiveness and accountability.
The state must be able to protect sensitive intelligence sources and operations, but secrecy should not become a justification for the absence of institutional oversight.
The Real Test Will Be Results
The repeated movement of the National Investigation Department between the Home Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office has demonstrated that the question is not simply one of administrative location.
The latest decision may shorten the distance between the intelligence agency and the Prime Minister. It may also improve the speed with which sensitive information reaches the highest level of government.
But that alone will not guarantee better intelligence.
The real test will be whether the NID can provide accurate assessments, identify emerging threats early, coordinate effectively with other security agencies and help the government make informed decisions.
The government should therefore evaluate the new arrangement based on measurable outcomes rather than administrative structure.
Did the agency provide timely warnings? Did it accurately identify emerging threats? Did its assessments reach the right decision-makers? Were those assessments used in government decision-making? And did the information help prevent or reduce security risks?
These are the questions that should determine whether the new arrangement is successful.
The Question Is No Longer Where the Department Sits
Nepal has repeatedly changed the administrative location of its principal intelligence agency.
That experience has already demonstrated that moving the NID between the Home Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office is not, by itself, a solution to the country’s intelligence challenges.
Nepal does need an intelligence agency that has direct and timely access to the Prime Minister.
But more importantly, it needs an intelligence institution capable of telling the Prime Minister the truth, assessing risks professionally and providing timely warnings before a crisis becomes uncontrollable.
If the government combines the latest structural change with institutional reform, professional development, technological modernization, adequate resources, effective inter-agency coordination and credible oversight, the move could strengthen Nepal’s national security architecture.
Otherwise, the country could once again find itself repeating the same cycle: changing the ministry, changing the law and changing the leadership—while leaving the fundamental weaknesses of the intelligence system unresolved.
The real issue, therefore, is not simply whether the National Investigation Department belongs under the Prime Minister’s Office or the Home Ministry.
The real question is whether Nepal can build an intelligence system capable of providing the right information, to the right people, at the right time—and ensuring that the information is acted upon.
